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The Chinese took building a post-
colonial world literally. It was as if the 
great roads that once linked the old 
empire and allowed the writ of the 
Emperor to extend anywhere provided 
a model for the twentieth century. The 
first major efforts along these lines took 
place between 1970 and 1977, when 
China spent US$2bn in Africa, a huge 
sum in those days, for no economic 
return. These were the years of the 
550-mile Somali border road and, in 
particular, the hugely ambitious Tazara 
Railway linking landlocked Zambia to the 
Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam. This 
provided a relief from the stranglehold 
white-ruled Rhodesia and South Africa 
applied to Zambian exports and imports 
shipped through those countries on 
transport routes installed in the days of 
Cecil Rhodes. 
But the most ambitious recent African 
project, not fully realised because of 
Western and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) pressure, was the transport 
and development corridor, road and 
rail, proposed in 2008 for Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). It would, at 
a stroke, have linked the entire south 
of an underdeveloped and troubled 
country that was also vast. Along this 
corridor, the Chinese had planned 
schools, hospitals, and even universities. 
Life and expectation would have been 
transformed. The US$9bn loan to 
finance this was exactly that, a loan 
not a grant, from Chinese banks, with 
US$3bn set aside to develop the mining 
industry in the area of the corridor. In 
return, the Chinese anticipated some 
6.8m tonnes of copper and 620,000 
tons of cobalt over 25 years. The people 
of DRC would have had huge benefits. 
So would China. It is this model which 
characterises recent plans in Pakistan.
The critical difference between any 
African project and the one involving 
Pakistan is that the Pakistani project 
leads from China itself and reaches 
the sea. It provides direct access to the 
maritime route for China’s One Belt, 
One Road (OBOR) initiative, which will 
see major infrastructure investment 
across the region both along the ancient 
Silk Road and along seagoing routes 
across which a vast amount of world 
Ever since the 1955 Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian states, China has been 
active in civil engineering projects around the world, especially in Africa, as a 
sign of its commitment to the world emerging from colonialism. In 2016, there 
are three key differences: (1) these projects have spread well beyond Africa; 
(2) infrastructure and a huge range of community facilities are now being built 
alongside roads and railways; and (3) projects are now less about redressing 
colonialism and more about China becoming a major player in the world. When 
it comes to Pakistan, will Chinese plans help it to both develop and move away 
from rebellion and fundamentalism? How much will these plans take into 
consideration the magnitude of the social problems in the provinces where their 
roads and railways cut through? There is a risk that the new provisions could 
become targets of insurrection instead of benefiting the local communities.
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trade currently flows. This direct access, via 
three major corridors, makes Pakistan, for 
now, a more important Chinese partner than 
India, despite China being one of India’s largest 
trading partners, and, notwithstanding intense 
efforts between the two countries to repair 
the damage caused by border conflict and 
political alliances during the Cold War years.
Indeed, the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor 
which covers 2,000 miles, will take 15 years to 
complete and which is estimated to come to 
US$46bn, could be one of the most expensive 
infrastructure projects in recorded history. 
Unequal development in Pakistan: 
One key province and one disputed 
territory
During the Cold War, Pakistan maintained 
relationships with both sides of the divide. 
On the one hand, relations with China were 
strengthened when both countries took 
steps to peacefully negotiate their shared 
boundaries in 1962, whereas similar border 
disputes with India resulted in the Sino-Indian 
War. On the other hand, Pakistan was 
cooperating with the United States, when its 
intelligence service channelled funds and arms 
to the mujahideen fighting the Soviet invasion 
of neighbouring Afghanistan in 1979. Years 
after the Soviets left and the Taleban seized 
power there remained strong links between 
the Pakistan intelligence service and the 
Taleban. This did not prevent Taleban-linked 
and styled groups operating also in Pakistan, 
in north-western territories never fully 
controlled by the Pakistani government. 
Pakistan is also a country of greatly unequal 
development and troubled politics which 
have seen military coups, fraught elections, 
and corruption. These factors can make 
cooperation a potential minefield. 
Two indicators of Pakistani human welfare, 
literacy and education, and health, demonstrate 
the unequal development overseen by 
successive Pakistani governments, and also 
show how the Chinese Silk Road extension 
through Pakistan will encounter areas which 
are experiencing this unequal development.
Literacy and education
Although there is a national literacy rate of 
64 per cent, this belies fluctuations from 
province to province and city to city. In 
Islamabad it is 96 per cent, but in Kohlu, in 
Balochistan province, it is only 28 per cent. 
The provincial literacy rate is higher overall 
than Kohlu, but is still only 45 per cent. To the 
north of Balochistan, in the tribal lands on 
the Afghan border, female literacy is 9.5 per 
cent – which is very low even in a country 
where only 18 per cent of females exceed 
ten years of education. Balochistan and the 
tribal territories represent a western landmass 
that is poverty stricken and through which, or 
alongside which, one corridor of the Silk Road 
extension will run. 
Health
Reading Pakistani health figures is different 
from those of other jurisdictions, where one 
key area to look at would normally be public 
health facilities. In Pakistan, however, public 
facilities can be of such low standard or simply 
unavailable, that access to health care is also 
measured in terms of access to private facilities.
Thus, in Punjab, average access to public 
hospitals is 20.59 per cent, but to private 
hospitals 72.27 per cent. In Balochistan, average 
access to public hospitals is 38 per cent, but to 
private hospitals 50.34 per cent. These figures 
suggest that the Balochistan area attracts little 
private investment and, in the health sector, it 
means recourse and access to medical choice 
is lower than in Punjab, even if it could be 
afforded. The building of private hospitals, 
sometimes but not always for charitable 
purposes, is a matter of great profile-raising in 
Pakistan. It helped make Imran Khan a credible 
political party leader, for instance. 
Insurrection in Balochistan and the tribal lands
The tribal lands in the north-west have never 
been under full government control and are 
occupied by militant groups and tribes that 
include the Pakistani Taleban. This is distinct 
from the Afghan Taleban, with whom Pakistan’s 
intelligence service kept strong links following 
its involvement in the Soviet-Afghan War, 
although the two groups have much ideological 
and confessional belief in common. Both 
groups may attack international targets outside 
the region from time to time, but the Afghan 
Taleban does not generally attack Pakistani 
targets, while the Pakistani Taleban does.
To the south of the tribal lands, but still 
running along the western border of Pakistan, 
is the province of Balochistan. This is not 
only a very poor and deprived province, but 
it also has its own militant rebel group that 
is convinced that the Pakistani government 
not only deliberately withholds development 
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aid, but has a genocidal policy towards the 
inhabitants of the province. This is a huge 
exaggeration. However, government reprisals 
against rebel activity have tended to be harsh 
and indiscriminating which may help to shore 
up this belief.
The proposed western corridor of the Silk 
Road project runs alongside the complete 
length of these tribal lands and right through 
Balochistan; and so it may be regarded both 
as a target and/or as a means of delivering 
development assistance and facilities.
The Silk Road as it goes through 
Pakistan
This part of the Silk Road is to an extent a 
detour or dogleg in land transport terms. 
The Pakistani route does not facilitate land 
transport from Kashgar, the westernmost city 
in China, as the main Silk Road passes through 
Transcaucasia to Turkey. However, the southern 
Pakistani port of Gwadar does link directly to 
the maritime version of the Silk Road and, in 
that sense, the Pakistani project provides key 
linkage with the overall plan.
Starting from China, the route through 
Pakistan utilises the existing Karakoram 
Highway, but then, once in Pakistan, divides 
into four routes that run vertically through the 
country. The central route would be the main 
transport and economic corridor, and would 
also reflect the main route of the railway 
linking China to Gwadar. As noted above, the 
western route would pass near or through 
deeply troubled and impoverished areas.
Investment in the Pakistani Silk Road
The comparative figure here, in terms of 
investment by another great power (the 
United States) in the Pakistani energy sector 
at least, is US$2bn since 2009. The figures 
above demonstrate the sheer magnitude of 
the Chinese commitment 
The figures on the chart above suggest that 
electronic communication is not a key part of the 
project while energy clearly is. This is to refurbish 
coal and gas generation along the routes of 
the road. Current Pakistani energy generation 
shortfalls cost 2–2.5 per cent of gross domestic 
product. Whether the Chinese investment is 
to reduce or fully make up that shortfall, or 
is intended to give surplus energy for future 
development, is at this stage uncertain. What is 
certain is that this is not being done for free.
The financing
Most of the transport and related project 
costs will come from China’s huge Silk Road 
fund – although it should be borne in mind 
that the overall Silk Road is huge and passes 
through many countries. Not much of the 
fund is coming Pakistan’s way. Instead, the 
major aspect of the project, redevelopment 
of the energy sector, will be financed by 
Chinese bank loans at a 5–6 per cent interest 
rate. These loans will help build up companies 
involved in energy redevelopment and they 
are likely to be Sino-Pakistani joint ventures. 
The Government of Pakistan will be obliged to 
buy power from these firms. Insofar as there 
will be majority Chinese shareholding of at 
least some of them, there will be long-term 
Chinese profits from a captive customer.
Major fragilities
Obviously the targetability of new facilities by 
rebel or insurgent groups will be a factor in 
the sustainability and operational capacity of 
the western corridor in particular. The second 
concern would be, in the event of surplus energy 
generation, would this be directed towards 
development of Balochistan and the tribal areas? 
Certainly the capacity to deliver infrastructure and 
institutional growth, e.g. schools and hospitals, 
to at least Balochistan, would be enhanced. 
Given the record of the Government of 
Pakistan to date in these areas, there is not 
necessarily strong ground for hope that major 
development drives would start in these areas. 
Additionally, there is the question of whether 
the firms, with Chinese origin, ownership 
or majority shareholding, would – in the 
construction and maintenance process – adopt 
corporate responsibility lessons learned 
 Figure 1 Chinese investment in Pakistan
Energy 
US$33.79 billion
Road building and 
refurbishment costs
US$5.9 billion
Rail building and 
refurbishment
US$3.69 billion
Mass transit scheme for Lahore
US$1.6 billion
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Policy recommendations
For the Chinese government
• Design and implement a ‘corporate responsibility’ programme, in collaboration 
with Pakistani authorities and the local communities aimed at the poorest and 
most troubled areas through which the corridors will pass – with especial care 
pertaining to outreach, education and health care for local peoples, but also 
employment opportunities in work related to the construction of the corridors.
• Design and deploy technology transfer schemes, linked to both employment and 
educational opportunities. The Chinese have not done this before, but it would 
attract significant local support for the project, and engender local efforts to 
defuse and prevent militancy targeting the project.
For the Pakistani government
• Work with Chinese companies and the Chinese government for the involvement 
and inclusion of communities in the mountainous areas adjacent to the corridors to 
gain trust in the project and build in measures to ensure tribes-people benefit from 
the new local facilities (for example, services tailored to their needs). 
• Review and refine approaches to security and safety in the region so as not to play 
into the rhetoric of genocide.
• Establish communication channels with local leaders and local governance 
institutions so the local communities are informed of and are aware of the 
potential benefits for them from the developments.
(reluctantly and not fully) by Shell and 
other petroleum companies in the Niger 
Delta and elsewhere in the world. There 
is not a strong Chinese record in this area 
in any part of the world. In Pakistan, it 
would make a substantial difference to 
the acceptability of the projects to local 
communities who might otherwise see the 
new transport networks as another means 
by which they may be bypassed, only faster 
and more efficiently than before.
In particular, although the western corridor 
does not enter the tribal areas directly, and 
these areas in any case are mountainous 
and difficult to access at the best of times, 
the proximity of this corridor to them does 
raise the possibility at last of a recognisable 
government effort to bring development 
into the vicinity. If development starts to 
seep into the mountains, or if tribesmen 
come down from the mountains to benefit 
from new facilities – and not simply to 
demand highway ‘toll’ from increased truck 
traffic – then there could be long-term 
possibilities of integrating the Pakistani 
Taleban into mainstream society. The 
example on the Pakistani side of the 
border could even inspire some Afghan 
Taleban to contemplate new ways forward. 
If, instead, the western corridor is simply 
securitised with heavy duty army presence, 
the divides and fissures of Pakistani society 
will only be increased.
Certainly, education and health could 
be enhanced with new facilities and 
institutions of the sort contemplated for 
Democratic Republic of Congo.
China will gain huge benefits from its new 
route to the sea and the maritime Silk 
Road. Pakistan could also gain huge benefits 
but would need to distribute them more 
evenly than its track record suggests it can. 
Certainly, as work progresses on the huge 
building and rebuilding of networks, China 
and its intrusion, for benefit or not, will be 
a political football in the fraught, uneven, 
and often violent politics of Pakistan.
